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TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE REAL EFFECTS AND COSTS OF INFLATION
Abstract
The traditional view that because money is neutral, inflation produces
no appreciable real effects is shown to hold approximately only for an
economy whose institutions are fully inflation proof, e.g. a fully
indexed one. But the real effects are shown to become more and more
widespread and serious as the institutions of the economy are more
nearly nominal. The paper examines in succession the consequences
of nominal government institutions (tax systems, definition of taxable
income, accounting procedures); of nominal private institutions and
accounting conventions (long term nominal contracts, measurement of income),
even when current and future inflation was and is fully anticipated.
It finally examines the effects of unanticipated inflation that is not
incorporated in existing nominal long term contracts, and of uncertain
future inflation. Whenever possible an attempt is made to discuss the social
cost of various real effects, even though current research leaves us a
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* Stanley Fischer and Franco Modigliani
There is no convincing account of the economic costs of inflation that
justifies the typical belief -- of the economist and the layman -- that inflation
poses a serious economic problem, relative to unemployment. In this paper we
pres~nt a systematic account of the real effects of in!lation that we hope will
contribute to understanding of and continuing research on the costs of inflation.
It will become clear that the effects of inflation can vary enormously
depending on two major factors: first, the institutional structure of the economy;
. and second the extent to which inflation is or is not fully anticipated. Because the
institutional structure of the economy adapts to ongoing inflation, the real effects
(and costs) of inflation can be expected to vary, not only among different economies,
but also in the same economy at different periods.
The organization of the paper is simple. We start by examining the real
effects of anticipated inflation in an economy that has fully adapted to inflation.
In particular, in this economy: (i) public institu;ions are fully attuned to inflation
(or inflation proof), (ii) the same is true of private institutions, (iii) current
and future inflation is fully reflected in inherited contracts, and (iv) future
inflation is fully reflected in contracts for the future. After we have discussed
the effects of anticipated inflation in this environment, we examine the real effects
of inflation that arise as the assumptions (i) to (iv) are dropped one after the
other. The effects cumulate in the sense that those present in the economy that
*M.I.T. This is a substantially revised version of the paper presented at
the Baden conference. We are indebted to Pekka Ahtiala, Rudi Dornbusch, John
Flemming, Jacob Frenkel, Lucas Papademos, Kari Puumanen and James Tobin for
comments. Research support to Fischer was provided by the National Science
Foundation.-2-
has fully adapted to inflation are also present in economies with non-inflation
proof institutions, and so on.
The organization of the paper enables us to provide a coherent listing of
the major real effects of inflation.l The list is long and surprisingly pervasive,
and is contained in its essentials in Table 1. The remainder of the paper may
be regarded as a commentary on Table 1, which will also be useful as a guide to the
subsequerit discussion. We should note that the space devoted in this paper to the
items on the list is not necessarily a judgment on their relative importance, but
in part reflects what is known about the particular effect. For instance, we have
much to say about the wealth redistributions associated with unanticipated inflation
but relatively little about the misallocations that result from increased uncertainty
that typically accompanies inflation. The latter effect may well be extremely
important, but very little systematic is known about it.
We have one other disclaimer to enter before we begin the substantive part
of the paper. Although the measurement of the social and private costs of inflation
is one eventual goal of research in this area, we do not attempt here to cost
systematically individual effects of inflation and hence to provide a quantitative
appraisal of the overall cost of inflation.2 Any measures would be almost totally
speculative at this stage; our listing of the real effects of inflation will show
that considerable detailed work is necessary before it will be possible to provide
serious answers to the key question of the real costs ( and benefits) of those
effects. We do, however, provide numerical estimates of the magnitudes of some
of the important effects, and in any event, we believe that the systematic listing
and discussion of the real effects or inflation that is provided in this paper is
a necessary step toward estimating the costs of inflation.-3-
TABLE 1: The Real Effects of Inflation
(Note: the real effects cumulate. For instance, the effects described in Section I
are present also under the assumption of Section II.)
Source of Effect Nature of Effect
Direct . Indirect (general equilibrium)
I. Fully Indexed Economy
No interest paid on
currency, a government
(outside) liability
Need to change prices
more frequently
1. Increase in government
revenue (inflation tax)
2. Economizing on currency
3. Reduction in priva.te
net wealth




G1 Reduction in other taxes
or increases in government
spending
G2 Diversion of resources to
transactions (shoe leather
costs)
G3 Offsetting increase in
capital stock, lowering real
interest rate.
II. Real Effects of Nominal Government Institutions
GS See Gl above
G6-10 Potential effects on
cost of capital to corpora-
tions and individuals, with
resultant effects on capital
accumulation. Changes in
patterns of financing.
.~ See aiso G1
5. Increased real income
tax bill
6. Reduction of net of tax
real return on lending rela-
tive to pre-tax real rate
7. Reduction of net real cost
of borrowing relative to pre-
tax real rate
8. Return to equity-holders
in levered corporations rises
given constant debt-equity
ratios; constant real pre-
tax interest rate on bonds,
and constant marginal product
of capital
9. Changes in government tax
recepts; net effect depends on
induced changes in pre-tax
real interest rate on bonds,






(a) taxation of nominal
interest income received
by persons
(b) deductability of nominal
interest paid by persons
(c) deductability of nominal
interest paid by corpora-
tions-4-
II. Real Effects of Nominal Government Institutions Cont.
(d) Depreciation at
origiual cost
(e) Cost of goods sold
measured at original
cost
10. Return to equity-holders
dec1i'Ples
11. Tax revenue increases
GlO~ll See also Gl
Combined effects vary among
firms, depending on nature of
.assets. Likely shift away
from use of long-lived assets.
Shift in inventory accounting
methods from FIFO to LIFO




12. Post-tax return to equity
owners on realized gains
declines if pre-tax return
remains constant
13. Lock in effects
14. Distortions in interpretations
of economic situation, e.g. nominal
interest share in GNP rises, savings
rate misinterpreted since both










15. Declining real repay-
ment streams relative to
nominal streams
16. Distortion of reports of
profits; other money illusions
based on confusion between
real and nominal interest
rates possible.
G15 Possible effects on real
interest rates, and therefore
investment
G16 Effects on stock market
valuation of firms; invest-
ment decisions.-5-
IV. Real Effects of Unanticipated Inflation Through Existing Nominal Contracts
Existing contracts for
goods or services fixed






buyer and seller if quantity
of services fixed by
contract
18. Effects on quantity of
services provided.
19. Distortions of relative
prices fixed at different
times
20. Redistribution from
private to public sector
21. Redistributions between
private debtors and creditors




redistributions by income size
G19 Misallocations of resource:
arising particularly from need




V. Real Effects of Uncertainty of Future Inflation
Need to make decisions
without knowledge of
future prices
22. Reluctance to make future
commitments without knowledge
of prices; absence of safe
asset
23 •., Shortening of nominal
contracts
G22 Changes in patterns of
asset accumulation
G23 Increased transaction
costs of making frequent
contracts, and loss of
planning ability








a rise in interest
rates
24. Wage and price controls






G25 Instability of financial
flows, with possible effects
on direction and level of
investment activity.-6-
I. The Indexed Economy
The starting point for analysis is a fully indexed economy. All debt instru-
ments are indexed, except currency, on which no interest is paid (because there is
no convenient way to do so); wage and salary contracts are indexed; the exchange
rate is freely flexible; tax brackets, fines, and other payments fixed by law are
indexed; real rather than nominal returns on assets are taxed; there are no nominal
interest rate ceilings; and so on. Demand side disturbances in this economy, arisir
for example from a change in the nominal stock of high powered money, would have
temporary real effects, depending on the frequency with which index adjustments are
made. Similarly, changes in the general price level might be the result of real
supply side disturbances, such as a change in the terms of trade. In discussing the
effects of inflation in such an economy, we abstract from the frictional real effects
of demand disturbances, and from the effects of real disturbances other than those
on the general price level.
In this section we discuss the effects of anticipated inflation, noting in
passing, however, that in a fully indexed economy unanticipated inflation has
very minor real effects, consisting essentially of a redistribution between the private
and public sectors. Such redistributions are discussed in more detail in Section IV.
The real effects and costs of anticipated inflation in. a fully indexed economy
would result from the absence of interest payments on currency, and from the "menu
costs" of changing prices and wages. First we examine the effects arising from the
non-payment of interest on currency, assumed initially to be a government liability,
which is outside wealth for the private sector. Anticipated inflation represents a
tax on real currency holding, since it reduces the real return earned by currency
holders. The other side of the tax analysis is that the government obtains-7-
tax receipts through the issue of new currency, if the inflation is caused by the
growth of high-powered money.
There are two potential routes for the anticipated inflation to affect real
variables. First, the demand for real currency should be expected to fall as a
result of the increased cost of holding it, producing the well-known shoe-leather
costs of inflation, the welfare cost of which is measured by the size of the triangle
under the demand for currency function. 3 As the optimal inflation tax literature has
~
emphasized, the optimal rate of inflation is not necessarily either zero or negative.~
The costs of inflation have to be calculated relative to that rate of inflation that,
as part of the overall pattern of taxation, minimizes the social costs of raising
government revenue. From this viewpoint, there are welfare costs from inflation
that are below the optimum rate, as well as from inflation above the optimum rate.
The costs of inflation arising from the reduced demand for currency have the
distinction of being the only costs that have been carefully measured. An estimate,
for the United States, can be constructed based on an assumed stock of curr~ncy of
about $100 billion, and a very generous estimate of the interest elasticity of demand
for currency of one-half. The annual cost of an increase of the inflation rate from,
say, 5 percent to 6 percent, would then be under $0.5 billion and this is a
relatively high estimate because the elasticity assumption is upward biassed.5
The second potential route through which fully anti~ipated inflation could
have real effects in the fully indexed economy is through the relationships
among inflation, saving, and capital accumulation. Capital accumulation, through
life cycle savings effects, results from the reduction in outside wealth caused
by the reduced value of high-powered money. Further, capital accumulation may
be encouraged as a result of the fall in the anticipated rate of return on an asset
alternative to capital, namely currency. Calculation will show that the reduction-8-
in wealth caused by the anticiapted inflation is small; given that fact and also
the fact that currency holdings are very small relative to those of capital, the
effects of the induced changes on the capital stock would probably also be small•
. Nonetheless, such changes would tend to offset the reduction in welfare caused
by the loss of liquidity.6
So far we have been considering the costs of a perfectly anticipated
inflation in an indexed economy where high-powered money is an outside asset.
If currency were inside money, then an increase in the inflation rate would still
produce a deadweight loss as the anticipated inflation reduced real currency holding.
However, with the right to issue currency now being assigned to the banking system,
an increased real bank revenue due to inflation would increase the value of bank
stocks and thus wealth, perhaps leading to a decline in capital accumulation; the
effects of a reduced return on currency on the demand for capital would tend to
work in the opposite direction.
The other source of the effects of inflation in a fully indexed economy is
the "menu costs" of changing prices. In principle, most prices in the indexed
economy could be quoted in the unit of account, the cost of a commodity basket.
In that case, the costs of changing nominal prices would be largely the costs of
calculating the nominal amount to be handed over in each transaction, based on the
stated indexed price of goods. There would be no need to change marked prices in
an indexed economy more often than in a non-inflationary environment.
At low rates of inflation it would probably be most convenient (cheapest)
to fix prices for many commodities in nominal terms. We have to distinguish here
between auction markets, in which prices are set to clear markets more or less
continually, and in which the costs of changing prices would not be affected by the
rate of inflation, and "custom" markets in which prices are set and usually held-9-
7 for some time. The menu costs of inflation arise in the custom markets, which
include those for labor, man~facturers,much of wholesale and retail trade, trans-
portation, and such obvious examples as pay telephones, vending machines, and parking
meters.
If we assume nominal pricing would be used at some low rates of inflation,
and that there is a fixed cost of changing a given nominal price in the custom
sector, then we should expect the frequency of price changes to increase with the
rate of inflation -- though we should, of course, recall that relative prices change
even in the absence of inflation. However, as the inflation rate rose, prices
would probably be adjusted relatively less frequently, so that the variability
of relative prices might increase as the frequency of absolute price changes
increased. If the system continued using nominal pricing, the menu costs of
inflation could become dramatic at high rate of inflation. Before such costs were
incurred, however, the system would probably switch over to the use of indexed
pricing. Tokens would be used for telephones and other vending machines, and parking
cards could be used in place of parking meters. The new real monies would compete
with the depreciating money, be a nuisance to carry, and likely reduce the govern-
ment's seignorage. The transitional costs of moving to such a system would also
be large.
Thus we should expect menu costs to rise with the (anticipated) inflation
rate up to some fairly high rate of inflation, at which time the system would start
switching over to another unit of account, and for some purposes, to stores of
value that substitute for currency. The costs of changing nominal prices thereafter
would be largely the costs of calculating nominal prices from stated real prices.
Overall, the non-payment of interest on currency and the menu costs of
changing prices do not generate substantial real' effects' of-10-
moderate rates of inflation. Additional real effects of inflation come into play
when we recognize the existence o~ nominal government institutions, to be discussed
next in Section II.
II. Real Effects of Nominal Government Institutions.
The way in which anticipated inflation interacts with nominal government
institutions to produce real effects on the economy depends on the particular
institutional structure of the economy. Our discussion in this section relates
primarily to the United States; while similar conclusions may apply in other
economies, the details are surely not identical.
The major source of the real effects of inflation that occur, as a result of
"nominal" government institutions is through the tax system. The tax system in
the United States was clearly intended for non-inflationary times, but it has been
little amended in response to the inflation of the last ten years. It is significant
that although indexation, particularly in regard to taxation of capita~ gains, was
discussed in the debates over the tax "reforms" to be introduced in 1979, such
"-_.- .
measures were not included in the bill finally passed.
Perhaps the best known tax effect occurs as a result of the non-indexation
of tax brackets in progressive income tax schedules. As nominal incomes rise,
and nominal tax brackets are not adjusted, the proportion of income that is taken
by the personal income tax rises. However, this effect is quite small: Sunley
and Pechman (in Aaron (1976)) estimate an elasticity of real income taxes with
respect to the price level of 1/2. In 1977, personal taxes were of the order of
$150 billion; a 1 percent increase in the price level would increase taxes by about
$0.75 billion. Even this small effect could be removed by the simple step of
indexation of-brackets, a change that has been introduced in Canada and other-11-
countries. It is also emphasized in Aaron (1976) that in fact the Congress has
made discretionary income tax changes that have kept average personal income tax
rates at about the same levels as in the fifties, despite the intervening inflation.
The effects of taxes on corporations and asset holders are potentially more
important than those arising from non-indexation of brackets. Taxes are levied on
the total nominal interest income received by individuals. Thus, if the pre-tax
real rate of return on an asset remains constant as the inflation rate increases,
the after-tax real rate .to the asset holder will fall. The magnitude of this
effect at the individual level is quite dramatic. Consider an individual for whom
the tax rate is 25 percent, and who is earning pre-tax and pre-inflation, 5 percent
nominal and real on his bonds. His after-tax real return is 3.75 percent. Now,
let the inflation rate rise to 5 percent, and the interest rate to 10 percent.
Then the nominal after-tax interest rate is 7.5 percent, and the after-tax real
rate received by the asset holder is 2.5 percent. The 5 percent inflation reduces
the real return by one third.
The other side of this coin, from the viewpoint of the individual, is that
nominal interest paid on personal debt is deductible from income on which taxes
are levied. Thus, insofar as nominal rates adjust fuily so as to leave the real
rate unchanged, preventing a redistribution from creditors to debtors in pretax
income, there would still be a redistribution of after-tax irtcome between creditors
and debtors. This redistribution in taxes may have further social implications
which will be examined later in connection with redistribution of wealth effects.
In addition, there would tend to be overall effects for net government tax take. Since
the household sector is, on balance, a creditor, net taxes should tend to rise, but
this effect could be more or less fully offset by the fact that debtors appear to be
on the average, richer, and hence in higher tax brackets, than creditors (see below).-12-
Corporations too are allowed to deduct nominal interest from their profits
before the corporate tax liability is calculated. As of a given debt-equity ratio,
and given a constant real interest rate and marginal product of capital, the real
return to stockholders would tend to increase. Whether the owners of the firm,
including bondholders, would have a greater or smaller real after-tax return,
depends on the relation between the corporate and individual income tax rates.
If we start with the strong and unrealistic assumption that the tax rate paid by
all individuals is the same, and also assume the pre-tax real interest rate on
bonds and marginal product of capital constant, the firm's owners could have
exactly the same real return independent of the rate of inflation if corporations
and individuals paid the same tax rates. If the corporate tax rate is higher than
the individual rate, an increase in the "inflation rate would reduce total taxes
paid by the firm's owners and government tax collection, and vice versa.
As long as we consider only the treatment of interest by the tax system,
the effects of inflation on total post-tax real returns of the owners of corporate
firms appear likely to be small; and after-tax real returns would not necessarily be
adversely affected by inflation. Subsidiary effects would arise if there were
changes in the relative post-tax real returns of bond and equity holders, which
induced a change in the debt-equity ratio and perhaps a change in the cost of
capital.
The next two elements in Table I that relate to the nominal tax system tend
to increase the taxes paid by corporations as the inflation rate rises. First,
depreciation is charged off at historical cost; the present discounted value of the
depreciation deduction from taxes falls as the inflation rate rises, given any
particular depreciation schedule. This unambiguously raises the cost of capital
to a corporation, as of given real interest rates. The second element -- the-13-
measurement of the cost of goods sold at original cost, and the consequent over-
statement of profits is not required by the tax laws. Firms have the choice
of using LIFO rather than FIFO inventory accounting methods, and the former will
prevent the overstatement of profits that FIFO produces in an inflationary environ-
mente Firms did growingly switch to LIFO as the inflation rate increased in the
'70's.
The more general effects of original cost depreciation depend on the nature
of firms' assets. There is in general a rise in the cost of capital as the inflation
rate rises, with the effect being greatest for firms using the longest lived capital.
There would presumably be both a fall in the rate of investment, and a shift to
shorter lived capital, as the inflation rate increased. It should be noted that the
effects of inflation that work through the tax treatment of depreciation are not
present in countries that allow 100 percent write-off of investment expenses in
the first year.
The presumption from the various effects of inflation on tax revenues that
we have discussed so far is that government revenue would rise with inflation,
mainly through a fall in the real value of the depreciation deductions. Davidson
and Weil (in Aaron (op. cit.)) find an elasticity of about three for the corporate
income tax with respect to inflation, based on a sample of large firms, and omitting
capital gains on outstanding debt. With corporate income taxes of about $40 billion
in 1976, the effect of a one percent increase in the price level is to increase
corporate income taxes by $1.2 billion. Allowing for tax exemption, the inflation
premium included in interest is likely to offset this effect to a very large
10 extent ,but there r.emains a net effect through higher taxes on personal interest
received. Any increases in government revenue would make it 'possible to reduce
other taxes or increase government spending, given the deficit.Il-14-
The taxation of nominal capital gains results in the after-tax real return
to equity and other asset holders being reduced by inflation, if the pre-tax real
return remains constant. It leads also to lock-in effects, given the principle of
taxation only on realization of the gains. The first effect tends to reduce the
return to equity holders, and would therefore likely lead to an increase in the
cost of capital for firms, and reduced investment. The allocative effects of lock-
ins are difficult to establish a priori; there is a general case to be made that
they inhibit the efficient operation of the capital markets by encouraging some
asset holders not to register their expectations in the market place by buying and
selling assets.
The tax effects reviewed are clearly complicated and many. The net directions
of those effects are not all obvious, and the overall impact of the tax system on
the sensitivity of the post-tax rates of return received by asset holders and the
cost of capital to the rate of inflation is uncertain.12 But, it appears that on
balance increases in the inflation rate will tend to increase the cost of capital
.
and reduce the after-tax real rate of return to wealthholders, given the marginal
product of capital and the pre-tax real interest rate.
Finally, in our consideration of nominal governmental institutions, we turn
to the inflation illusion that is present in economic statistics. It is clear
first that inflation increases the reported share of interest in GNP, since interest
is reported as nominal and not real. It would be preferable to present real in.terest
earnings by deducting the capital losses on outstanding bonds from interest, and
adding them to profits or whatever other category they should enter.
In particular, insofar as net interest is paid by the government, the infla-
tion premium portion should be treated as a repayment of principle to the debt
holders and thus deducted from government expenditure. Failure to do so leads-15-
to an overstatement of the current government deficit which can be quite large
when inflation is significant. Thus, a recomputation of the deficit to reflect
the fall in the real value of government liabilities -- or repayment of real debt
through the inflation premium -- would involve a major change. in the perspective on
the last few years deficits in the U.S.; for instance, in 1978, government
liabilities to the public will fall in real value by about $45 billion, or
approximately the size of the deficit.
Similarly, the nominal treatment of private and government interest payments
leads to an overstatement of both personal and disposable income as well as saving,
since it treats as income and saving respectively what should be correctly treated
as a return of capital and the reinvestment thereof. It might be argued that with
respect to the government the nominal deficit is still the relevant measure since it iR
the amount that needs to be financed with resulting crowding out effects. But in
reality that portion of interest payments that represents a repayment·of principle
should give rise to matching "saving" available for reimbursement by the public.
To be sure, to the extent that the public is fooled into treating as income what
is not, there may be some net reduction in real saving with final effects analogous
to crowding out. But there is clearly no reason why these effects would be
captured by using a wrong measure of interest earned and paid.
The accounting errors referred to in the previous two paragraphs are not
widely recognized, and may even influence policy. Thus, the overstatement of
the government deficit creates at least the potential for errors in fiscal management.
At any rate, it is hard to believe that intelligent policy making is systematically
aided by the use of inappropriate measurement.-16-
III. Real Effects of Nominal Private Institutions
The private sector as well as the government has continued to use nominal
institutions and practices in the face of ongoing inflation. At the same time,
there have been financial innovations in the past decade that mitigate the effects
of inflation on the private sector one important illustration is the introduction
of floating rate debt instruments. In this section we concentrate on the effects
arising from the continued use of nominal annuity contracts and mortgages, and from
the reliance on nominal accounting methods, while still maintaining the assumption
that inflation is anticipated.
Reliance on the level payment nominal mortgage as the major vehicle for
financing residential housing means that the time pattern of real repayments on a
mortgage is tilted by inflation. Since the nominal payment is the same in each
month on a level payment mortgage, the real value of the payment falls over time
if there is inflation; the tilt is greater the higher the inflation rate. If
the real interest rate remains constant, initial real repayments, for a
mortgage of given real value at the time of purchase, will rise with the
inflation rate. Similar statements can be made in the case of nominal
annuites, purchased by constant nominal payment streams;
the real value of the payments by the purchaser of the annuity will fall over time;
then after the annuity starts paying out to the purchaser, the real value of the
. f 11 . 13 rece~pts a over t~me.
The consequences of the tilting of the repayment stream on mortgages are
thoroughly explored in Modigliani and Lessard (1975). The use of nominal mortgages
means that inflation substantially increases the real burden of financing in the
early years of home ownership, and on those grounds reduces the demand for housing
(of course, the demand for housing may rise because it is an inflation hedge.-17-
See below.)
The continued use of constant nominal repayment mortgages poses problems
also for the financial intermediaries that issue them. We discuss these difficulties
in Section VI, though they fit in also in Section IV.
The continued use of nominal accounting methods in the private sector leads
to distortions of reported profits and other accounting magnitudes. Evidence by Bulow
and Shoven (1975, 1976) and Davidson and Weil (in Aaron, 1976) indicates that these
distortions are substantial as between firms in a given period. Such distortions
create potential misallocations of resources, partly because internal firm data may
be misinterpreted, and partly because markets may incorrectly assess the relative
desirability of investment by different firms, and provide capital at an inappropri-
ate cost. It is possible to argue that such errors would ultimately be self-
eliminating, but we find it difficult to know how the stock market and the capital
markets in general are to divine "true" profits of corporations if the firms them-
1 d k h f
o 14 se ves . 0 not now t e pro 1tS.
Accounting reforms have been proposed by committees in a number of countries,
but have not been adopted. The failure to change accounting methods stems both
from the inertia arising from the need to convince and educate the accounting pro-
fession and from the intellectual difficulties of problems such as the appropriate
treatment of inflation-induced gains to firms from the reduction in the real value
of their outstanding debt. Nor is it clear that firms whose accounting profits
would change with the reform would be uniformly enthusiastic about changes in account-
ing systems.
The use of nominal accounting methods is one example of the type of money
illusion that may remain in the economic system despite continuing inflation; this
illusion results from the convenience of using money as a unit of account, rather-18-
than the medium of exchange function. On a priori grounds we are reluctant to
believe such illusions can remain in the system over long periods, but there does
appear to be some evidence of their continued existence. They are familiar in
everyday discussion; it also appears that even the supposedly sophisticated capital
markets may be using nominal interest rates to capitalize real profits.lS All
such illusions must ultimately be self-destructive, but the surprise is that they
still persist.
IV. Real Effects of Unanticipated Inflation Through Existing Nominal Contracts
We now consider the real effects of unanticipated inflation that occur through
the existence of nominal contracts for goods and services, and for debts. The
primary effects that have received major attention are the redistributions of income
and wealth associated with unanticipated inflation; there are in addition possible
changes in the level of economic activity, and misallocations arising from ignorance
about relative prices.
We will start with the income and wealth redistributions. The direction
of the income redistribution associated with unanticipated inflation will depend-
on the details of the contract structure of the economy. It has typically been
believed that wages lag behind in inflation, and that inflation therefore implies
a shift away from wage-earners, and towards profits. It is presumably on the same
grounds that the claim is often made that inflation hurts the poor relatively more
than the rich.
There seems to be no way a priori of predicting the direction of the income
redistributions, by function (wage, rent, etc.) or size, associated with unanticipated
inflation; the direction may well depend on the source of the unanticipated inflation.
For instance, an exogenous wage push would have different implications for the-19-
redistribution of income associated with the induced inflation than would a change
in the price of oil. Empirical evidence for the post War United States economy is
that inflation has, if anything, redistributed income to the lower quintiles of
the income distribution (Blinder and Esaki (1977)), and towards labor income
(Bach and Stephenson, 1974). However, examination of the cited empirical results
will show that the effects are indeed very small; inflation does not appear to have
major effects on the functional or size distributions of income.16
The wealth redistributions arising from unanticipated inflation are more
substantial. The redistribution is obviously from nominal creditors to nominal
debtors. The emphasis in discussing these redistributions is usually along sectoral
lines, an approach we shall follow for expositional purposes. From the viewpoint
of the private sector as a whole, the unanticipated change in the price level
reduces the real value of their outstanding claims on the government. But that is
not the end of the story. The reduction in the real value of the debt reduces the
real value of future tax payments required to service or retire the debt.
The increased disposable income of the younger generation, whose taxes have
been reduced, leads them to save more, thus increasing the capital stock, while the
corresponding reduction in consumption comes from the retired, whose real wealth
has been reduced. There is thus a redistribution from the older generation to
younger and future generations. The transfer should be thought of as chiefly inter-
generational within the household sector rather than between the private and public
sectors; its extent is reduced insofar as retired consumption is financed through
indexed social security.
Within the private sector, the shift between the corporate and household
sectors is frequently singled out for special discussion as an effect of an
unanticipated increase in the price level. The unanticipated increase in the-20-
price level reduces the real value of outstanding corporate debt, apparently
benefitting corporations at the expense of households. The redistribution is
ultimately, however, between different households; the reduction in the value
of the outstanding debt should be reflected in an increase in the value of
corporate equity, leaving the net wealth of the private sector unaffected. The
redistribution is fundamentally from the more risk averse to the less risk averse
this perhaps corresponding to the popular notions of suckers and sharpies.
However, the assumption that the value of corporate equity rises with
unanticipated inflation is not borne out by United States data.17 Part of the
explanation for this consistent empirical findin~ may be the increased real tax
burden caused by an increase in the price level.- Other explanations for this
characteristic of the United States capital market are examined 'in Lintner (1975)
and Modigliani and Cohn (forthcoming).
The extent of the wealth redistributions associated with unanticipated
inflation is examined in some detail in the article of Modigliani and Papademos
in this volume and will be only summarized here. It is shown to depend on the
maturity structure of existing debt and on the path of unanticipated inflation over
the life of the assets. Specifically, for an asset of a given (remaining) maturity
the redistribution is roughly proportional to the unanticipated change in the price
level over the life of the asset (or the cumulated unanticipated rate of inflation).
It follows in particular that a one percent unanticipated inflation in the current
period followed by no unanticipated inflation in later periods would produce a
transfer of one percent of the value of outstanding debt.
Now, how large are the wealth redistributions associated with unanticipated
inflation in the United States? The total value of nominal assets in the United
States economy on December 31, 1975 was about $4.7 trillion, composed of the assetsWe must, therefore, acknowledge
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shown in Table II. This does not mean that an unanticipated change in the price
level of one percent redistributes $47 billion of wealth, since individuals and
institutions hold both nominal assets and nominal liabilities, and because there
is some pyramiding of the asset structure.
It is more relevant to the question of redistributions to look at the
household sector's balance sheet for nominal assets and liabilities.18 Table
III shows that the household sector had in 1975 about $1.8 trillion in nominal assets,
and just under $800 billion in nominal liabilities. The net outstanding value of
nominal assets held by the private sector was over $1 trillion, so that an unanti-
cipated change in the price level by one percent would have reduced the real value
of househQld sector net holdings of nominal assets by about $10 billion. However,
this $10 billion figure probably understates the total real losses of those who
on balance lost from inflation since the balance sheets of different individuals
no doubt differ in proportions from those of the .sector as a whole. Assuming no
,
major changes in asset positions since 1975, a number like $15 billion would be in
the ball park as a measure of the loss of real wealth suffered on nominal asset
account by all those in the private sector who on balance lose on nominal asset
account from the inflation.
Of course, $15 billion does not reflect the total effects of the inflation
on distribution, since it does not adjust for the effects of a change in the price
level on the real value on non-nominal assets and liabilities, particularly equity
and housing. For equity, existing evidence is that an increase in the price level
reduces real value; for housing there is little evidence, but a belief that the
real value of housing rises with inflation. 19
a great deal of uncertainty as to the net effect of inflation on the real value
of real assets in the U.S.-22-
TABLE II: Outstanding Volume of Nominal Assets in
U.S. Economy, December 31, 1975
$ billions
Demand dzposits and currency
Time and saving accounts




State and local government















Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, 1946-1975, Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
December 1976, p. 90-23-
TABLE tIl: Balance Sheet for Nominal Assets and Liabilities Held by
Household Sector in U.S., December 31, 1975
Assets
Demand deposits and currency
Time and savings accounts
Credit market instruments
Federal government
State and local government
































Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, 1976, Rederal Reserve Board of Governors, p. 100-24-
One very important aspect of wealth redistribution is from the young
to the old, but unfortunately the relevant evidence is skimpy. The only system-
atic information we have is taken from Bach and Stephenson (1974). (Table IV
reproduces part of the relevant table from Bach and Stephenson.) Using a 1969
20
survey, they find that the ratio of net nominal to real assets rises with the age
of the head of household, and, in particular, that it is only after the age of 55
that households become net creditors in nominal terms. If this evidence stands
up, then the indication is that the redistributions which occur when the price
level rises chiefly reduce the real wealth of the old, while increasing the real
wealth of the young. As noted above, such redistributions tend to be mitigated by
the existence of indexed social security in the United States.
We can also use Table IV to look at the net nominal creditor position by
income class. It turns out that those with very high and very low incomes are net
nominal creditors, while the middle of the income distribution is occupied by nominal
debtors. Thus we can think of the redistribution as being from those with high and
low current incomes to those with intermediate incomes, but we should emphasize
that such statements cannot be made meaningful without standardizing for the stage
of the life cycle, something we are not able to do with the data we have.
We have so far been discussing the extent of redistribution caused by an
unanticipated one percent change in the price level. We noted, however that the
redistributions caused by a change in the inflation rate depend on the maturity of
the outstanding stock of nominal obligations. Of the assets and liabilities of the
households shown in Table III, about $900 billion of assets and over $500 billion of
liabilities are of a term longer than one year. On the assets side, life insurance
and pension fund reserves are of long maturity, as are mortgages on the liability
side. The effects of a change in the inflation rate might roughly cancel out for-25-
TABLE IV: Assets and Debts of Households, Early 1969
Percent of Total Assets
Percent All Total Assets Variable
Age of Head Households ($ billion) Monetary Price
of Household (1 ) (2) Assets Assets Debts (2) / (1)
18-24 10 27 14 86 49 2.7
25-34 21 189 8 92 48 9.0
35-44 18 335 9 91 37 18.6
i
45-54 17 366 13 87 22 21.5 I
I
55-64 15 301 21 79 9 20.1






Under $3000 17 92 20 80 8 5.4
3000-4999 14 119 20 80 15 8.5
5000-9999 33 350 18 82 23 10.6
10,000-14,999 24 420 14 86 29 17.5
15,000-24,999 9 359 12 88 21 39.9
25,000-49,999 2 177 14 86 18 88.5
50,000 and
over 0.4 105 18 82 10 262.5
Source: Bach and Stephenson (1974), p. 6, based on data from Michigan
Survey Research Center, 1969 Survey of Consumer Finances-26-
these classes of assets and liabilities. That still leaves over $400 billion of
other longer-term nominal assets. The maturity of these assets is not known,
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though that of federal obligations is close to three years. Accordingly, a
one percent change in the inflation rate would reduce the current value of these
assets by substantially more than $4 billion.
It is clear that the wealth redistributions arising from unanticipated
inflation are large, of the order of one percent of GNP per one percent unanticipated
(
increase in the price level. While these effects are large, it is difficult to
attach a social cost to them. For every loser there is a gainer; to calculate the
social costs of the redistributions it would be necessary to have a Bergsonian
social welfare function that appropriately weights the welfare of every individual.
Unfortunately, there are no data on individual redistributions, and we do not have
an accepted welfare function at: hand.
We have devoted considerable attention to the wealth redistributions
associated with unanticipated inflation. This is partly because the redistributions
have received a good deal of attention in the literature, and in part because there
are some relevant data; but it is also because the extent of the redistributions
is substantial.
We turn next to the other real effects that occur through the use of
nominal contracts. The fixity of some prices might give unanticipated inflation
real effects on the level of economic activity. One of the main theories underly-
ing the Phillips curve (Lucas, 1973) argues that unanticipated inflation increases
labor supply and therefore output, and Keynesian sticky wage theories would also
suggest that unanticipated inflation increases output.
The fixity of nominal prices may also lead to misallocations of resources
in the face of unanticipated inflation, as relative prices change -- because of the-27-
differential costs of changing prices in different markets, and because of imperfect
information about relative prices a~ong consumers. It is reasonably well established
22 that relative price variability increases with the inflation rate; such increased
variability leads to misallocations of resources, and to the absorption of resources
in search and information gatherir.g ac- tivitiE's.
V. Real Effects of Uncertainty of Future Inflation
Practical men tend to emphasize that inflation makes it difficult to plan
in the absence of knowledge of future prices. This argument clearly implies that
uncertainty about future price levels is increased at high inflation rates. We
know that in principle there is no necessary link between the rate of inflation
and the variability of the inflation rate. In fact, it appears that the variability
of the rate of inflation (which is not quite the same as uncertainty about the rate)
increases with the level of inflation. Flemming (1976) suggests' the reason may be
that governments typically announce unrealistic stabilization programs as the
inflation rate rises, thus increasing uncertainty about what the actual path of
prices will be.
If we accept the link between the level of inflation and uncertainty about
future price levels, we can ascribe to inflation the effects that arise from the
need to make decisions with decreased certainty of future price levels. The first
effect is a change in the pattern of asset accumulation. If there is no indexed
asset, increased uncertainty about future prices reduces the safety of nominal
assets, and increases the relative attractiveness of real assets as inflation
hedges. Residential structures occupy a prominent position among such assets,
especially when the performance of the equity values is as disappointing as it
has been in the recent inflation allover the world. Other assets the public may-28:-
turn to include non-reproducible tangible wealth such as land, gold, art work,
etc. Given the fixity of the supply, the prices of such assets will tend to be
bid up faster than the general price level. It is entirely conceivable that the
resulting "capital gains" increase in real wealth will result in a decline in
saving and, finally, in physical investment.
A second effect of uncertainty about the rate of inflation is the shortening
of contracts. Uncertainty about the real value of the quid for which the quo
is being exchanged is likely to reduce the use of long-term contracts. Uncertainty
about the rate of inflation should lead also towards the use of indexed contracts.
There seems to be some evidence of this in labor markets, but very little in capital
markets, except through the use of floating rate notes, which are equivalent to
shortening the effective maturity of the contracts. This reduces uncertainty about
the real value of the payments over the lifetime of the note, but also implies
sacrificing the possibility of hedging against future movements of the real rate.
Both the changes discussed in the previous two paragraphs -- shifts in th~
demand for assets, towards inflation hedges, and the shortening of contracts
would tend to reduce the rate of investment by firms, and lead to investment in
shorter lived assets.
VI. Real Effects of Government Attempts to Suppress Symptoms of Inflation
Governments frequently attempt to suppress inflation using wage and price
controls. Such controls are likely to produce serious distortions and inequities,
particularly when they are introduced at times of excess demand. Measures of the
extent of the distortions for particular cases have apparently not been undertaken,
though anecdotal evidence on shortages induced by wage and price controls abound.
Governments also intervene in attempts to control rising interest rates, or-29-
the consequences of potential increases in interest rates. Attempts to keep
interest rates. from rising in inflationary situations may result from the desire
of the government to avoid the imposition of capital losses on bond holders, in
part under the fear that large capital losses would tend to destroy the capital
markets. Attempts to keep interest rates low by monetary policy are ultimately
destabilizing; attempts to keep them low through controls lead also to credit
rationing and also to disintermediation and misallocation of"funds.
In the United States, Regulation Q, which controls the interest rates paid
by ,financial intermediaries, has been responsible for episodes of disintermediation
in credit crunches in 1966, 1970, and 1974. The disintermediation resulted in
sharp reductions in construction activity. However, the control over interest
rates imposed by Regulation Q may well have been desired by the financial inter-
mediaries, since competitive rises in interest rates would have led to large
losses for them, as the rates they would have had to pay on their liabilities
would have exceeded receipts from their assets. (See Modigliani and Lessard, 1975).
The ultimate cause of Regulation Q and the credit crunches may be thought of as
the extreme imbalance in the maturity structure of the balance sheets of financial
intermediaries -- borrowing very short, lending verylong'-~~ratner than government
concern with interest rates as such. . The effects we attribute here to
government intervention are certainly partly to be ascribed also to the existence
of nominal institutions in the private sector. It is worth noting that the financial
intermediaries in the United States have innovated significantly in recent years,
both by introducing new debt instruments (rollover mortgages, variable rate
mortgages, etc.) and by inventing new liabilities (generally of longer term,
some with variable interest rates, tied to the treasury bill rate).
It should be recognized that the cost o~ government intervention must beinterferences with the market mechanism -- some of which costs are
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set against the possible reduction in cost that may arise from success in suppressing
some symptoms or concomitants of inflation. For instance, if it succeeded in
keeping the price level permanently lowe~ then it might avoid the cost of redistri-
bution. On the other hand artificially holding down long term interest rates
reduces the cost to the initial holders of long term debt, but it increases the
cost to those investing in money fixed assets thereafter perpetuating the transfer
from creditors to debtors. A full cost~benefit analysisoof government intervention
is actually a complex task. The prevailing conviction among economists today seems
to be that the costs resulting from attempts to suppress or reduce inflation through
gove~~ent
outlined above -- are likely on balance to outweigh the benefits even when, if
initially, they may appear to produce small gains. Though this view could no
doubt stand some closer scrutiny, particularly in terms of redistribution effects,
the task is clearly beyond the scope of this survey.
VII. Concluding Comments
Perhaps the only surprising feature of this paper is the length of the list
of the real effects of inflation. Conventional analysis of the welfare costs of
inflation emphasizes the area under the demand curve for money as the cost of
anticipated inflation and redistributions as the cost of unanticipated inflation.
However, in economies that have not fully adapted to inflation -- and that means
all economies -- potential real effects are far more pervasive. Some of these
real effects are very hard to pin down -- for instance, the extent of misallocations
caused by variability of relative prices and uncertainty of future price levels,
but they may well be as important as the costs that are conventionally emphasized.
We should also repeat that measurement of the costs of the real effects-31-
that we have listed is obviously a task of importance. Our hope is that systemiza-
tion of the list of real effects will assist in organizing attempts to measure the
costs (and benefits) of inflation.-32-
FOOTNOTES
1. The listing is probably incomplete, and the emphasis possibly not to everyone's
liking. We have been struck by reactions to this paper of the nature: "Of
course, you omitted (or failed to emphasize) the most important item, X", where
X varies widely. Such reactions of course reflect the lack of quantitative
knowledge of the effects of inflation.
2. Surveys of the costs of inflation are contained in Phelps (1972), Foster (1972),
Laidler and Parkin (1975), and Flemming (1976). Laidler (1975), Okun (1975),
and Solow (1975) contain useful non-survey discussions of the costs of inflation.
The present paper has benefited considerably from the stimulus of a paper by
Tobin (1976).
3. This cost has the dimension of a flow, $/time. For some purpose one may be
interested in the capital value of this flow, through suitable discounting. A
recent paper by Martin Feldstein (1977) raises some difficulties about the
discounting procedure.
4. See, for instance, Edmund Phelps (1973),
5. Even if we assumed the inflation tax applied to M1~ the annual welfare cost of
the tax would be under $2 billion. But in the fully indexed economy, demand
deposits would pay interest at least equal to the rate of inflation.
6. The effects of anticipated inflation on capital accumulation have been at
the center of a long controversy. Such effects do arise in the context of
life-cycle utility-maximizing individuals or families with finite horizons,
but they do not occur in steady state if the family effectively has an infinite
horizon (see Sidrauski (1967), Fischer (1978),
7. The distinction is Arthur Okun's (1975); it is related to some Hicksian
distinctions.-33-
8. The "might" is included since the variability of relative prices would depend
on both the correlation of the timing of price changes and the frequency of
such changes.
9. Increased variability of relative prices might absorb resources as individuals
search for information on prices; this point is taken up in more detail in
Section IV.
10. This conclusion is suggested by a comparison of the magnitude of the over-
statement of equity returns due to inventory and nominal depreciation with
the magnitude of the understatement due to real capital gains or debt. See, e.g.,
study of Bulow and Shoven (1975-1976) and Davidson and Weil (in Aaron, op.cit.).
11. It is estimated by Fellner, et. ale (1975) that taxes in 1974 were $17 billion
higher than they would have been had the tax system been indexed. The inflation
rate in that year was about 10 percent and tax receipts $265 billion.
12. The effects discussed in this section have been studied recently by Feldstein
and others; see for example Feldstein and Summers (1978).
13. In principle, the tilting of the payments stream could be offset by anyone
with access to the capital markets, by borrowing to make the early payments.
Loans for such smoothing purposes do not appear to be readily available.
14. Preliminary evidence by Modigliani and Cohn (forthcoming) seems to show that the
capital markets do, at least in aggregate, correctly adjust for inappropriate in-
ventory and depreciation accounting, but do not adjust for capital gains accruing
to equity owners as inflation reduces the real value of outstanding debt.
15. See Modigliani and Cohn (forthcoming).
16. Preliminary empirical work shows that the results of Blinder and Esaki and
Bach and Stephenson are not fundamentally changed when the effects of anti-
cipated and unanticipated inflation on the income distribution are distinguished.-34-
17. See Zvi Bodie (1976) and Charles Nelson (1976).
18. The household sector in these tables is actually "Households, Personal
Trusts, and Nonprofit Organizations."
19. Budd and Seiders (1971) in their study of the effects of inflation on dis-
tribution argue that real estate maintains but does not increase its real
value in the face of inflation. They do claim that real equity values rise
with inflation.
20. The Michigan Survey Research Center stopped its surveys of consumer financies
after 1970; they are in the process of being reinstated (in 1978).
21. Economic Report of the President, 1977, Table 77.
22. Jaffee and Kleiman (1975), and Vining and Elwertowski (1976)./ -35-
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